Nas ultimas semanas, os jornais relataram um numero impressionante de relações familiares no governo de António Costa: casais, primos, irmãos a assumir cargos públicos em vários ministérios e secretariados de estado. Este artigo no Jornal Economico aponto a existência de uma rede de 50 pessoas e 20 famílias, todas elas ligadas ao governo e ao partido socialista.
Mesmo se o artigo do Jornal Economico é muito detalhado, é difícil ter uma vista global de esta rede. Isto é matéria ideal para uma análise de rede social (SNA). O mapa acima mostra a rede de relações familiares no governo de António Costa usando o artigo do Jornal Economico. O que fiz concretamente: fiz uma lista de indivíduos e entidades governativas mencionadas no artigo e o tipo de ligações entre elas. As ligações familiares (e em certos casos amigáveis) estão indicadas em vermelho. Os indivíduos estão em vermelho e as entidades em cinzento. E possível aceder uma versão alta resolução se clicar na imagem.
Os dados utilizados para construir esta rede estão aqui. E possível eu ter esquecido algumas ligações, por isso é possível comentar na lista para adicionar indivíduos e entidades.
É importante clarificar que todas as relações no mapa não são necessariamente ilegais ou mesmo relacionadas com nepotismo. Acontece que quando se está envolvido na política, há uma grande probabilidade de este fato estruturar o resto das relações sociais (incluindo a escolha de cônjuge). Também é normal pessoas das mesmas famílias partilharem as mesmas ideias políticas. O que se torna problemático (para a democracia) é se ter ligações familiares torna-se uma condição para aceder certos cargos públicos. Finalmente, este mapa não implica que não há práticas semelhantes em outros partidos que estiveram no poder ( ver aqui.
This is a extended repost of a blog written with Jasper Simons for Critcom, the blog of the Council of European Studies.
If one were to believe the assessments of European institutions, Portugal is on the path to recover from the severe economic crisis it suffered from 2010 onwards, and the drastic reforms implemented in employment protection, unemployment benefits and collective bargaining are starting to yield results. Portugal swiftly implemented most of the measures contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed with the Troika. Since then, exports have gone up, debt accumulation slowed down and unemployment decreased as well.
However labour market restructuring came with a high price tag, and the apparently promising numbers hide somewhat less encouraging developments for the long-term recovery of the country. The imposed changes to its political economy have not only led to a considerable deterioration of social protection, but they also coincided with high levels of emigration. The labour force has shrunk, and an impending demographic problem will be very difficult to reverse.
Portugal’s pre-crisis performance within the euro area, in contrast to Greece and Spain, was rather sluggish. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, José Sócrates’ socialist government (2005-June 2011) responded with a stimulus programme to push consumption and increase investment in the real economy. Active labour market and welfare policies improving access and levels of unemployment benefits were adopted in order to maintain demand and contain rising poverty. The coverage of unemployment insurance (the share of unemployed people actually receiving benefits) had steadily improved since 2000 (Figure 1
With Portugal’s fiscal position worsening, the government quickly turned to spending cuts and deregulation reforms geared towards reassuring markets. These programmes could not prevent bankruptcy, however, and Portugal was forced to request a 79 billion euro bailout with even more severe austerity and flexibilisation policies attached. The MoU included, inter alia, the revision of the labour code and severe reductions in severance and overtime payments, measures increasing the scope for the individualisation of contracts and dismissals and lowering and restricting access to unemployment benefits, which the centre-right Passos Coelho government (June 2011-November 2015) implemented.
Firstly, employment protection and severance payments (of fixed-term contract workers) have been severely affected. Although Portugal still has relatively high protection levels in the European context (and had one of the highest levels in the run-up to the crisis), no other European country has witnessed such a strong liberalisation trajectory since the crisis (see Figure 2). Alongside the flexibilisation of dismissals, minimum severance payment requirements for employers were lowered. For instance, severance pay in case of a redundancy dismissal for a worker with five years of tenure dropped from 21.7 to 14.3 weeks between 2010 and 2013. The minimum wage was frozen at 485 euros/month from 2011 onwards (565 with Christmas bonuses), until the new left-wing coalition that came to power in 2016 increased it again.
Secondly, unemployment benefits were cut and eligibility requirements tightened reducing overall benefit. If unemployment did not decrease until recently, the share of people receiving benefits did decrease right when the government needed to cut expenditure. Coverage for both social and the ordinary unemployment benefits decreased: if high unemployment levels in Southern Europe often make the headlines, it is seldom mentioned that the actual number of unemployed people who receive benefits is much lower, and Southern Europe has had a rather poor record in this respect. Interestingly, if unemployment levels have decreased, this may have as much to do with the shrinking of the labour force as with the creation of jobs: between 2008 and 2014, the labour force (people in employment or seeking work) has shrunk by 303.000 people. If the number of jobs remains stable but the labor force decreases, unemployment goes down. This partly results from discouragement of workers, but also to a large extent from emigration. In fact, emigration may have had a greater impact because, as the government admitted, the number might be twice as high as official figures display. The Portuguese population has been shrinking since the crisis, and emigration added to an impending demographic problem, with the lowest fertility rates in the EU (1.23 children per woman) (Figure 3).
Thirdly, collective bargaining has been decentralised in favour of firm level and individual agreements. Reforms of, erga omnes, extension have led to sweepingly decreasing coverage levels for ordinary workers (see figure 6). Remarkably, both the socialist and centre-right governments largely implemented these policies with the support, albeit lukewarm, of the social partners. Although the larger communist CGTP-IN remained absent, the socialist UGT worked together with employer organisations and both governments on many of the reforms including most of the MoU. This came, however, at the cost of internal division, loss of membership and various general strikes of both the CGTP-IN and the UGT. Source: UGT
Alexandre Afonso is an Assistant Professor at the University of Leiden, Netherlands. Jasper Simons is a political economy graduate and former European Economic and Social Committee trainee.
Mass unemployment is probably one of the most worrying features of the Eurozone crisis. As youth unemployment is hitting record levels (one in four people under 25 in Europe and more than one in two in Spain are officially out of work), many observers are warning against the rise of a “lost generation”, especially in Southern Europe. The European central Bank and international financial situations may have developed an obsession for deficit and debt reduction, but mass unemployment can be considered a much more worrying problem in the long term for both workers and governments. For workers, skills deteriorate when they are out of work, and as technology goes forward, their likelihood of finding a job tend to decrease with the duration of unemployment. For governments, each period of mass unemployment tends to increase the incompressible threshold of structural unemployment. When the number of unemployed increases en masse, it is very difficult to come back to the initial level even in the case of an upturn, as many workers driven out of work for too long are never able to come back into employment again. The problem is even more serious when unemployment concerns primarily young people at the beginning of their career, who cannot even start climbing the ladder in the first place.
In this context, what can governments do, and how do different types of reform impact on public deficits and inequality? In the late 1990s, political economists have argued that service economies, where economic and productivity growth tend to be much lower than in the past, entail a “trilemma” between high employment, low inequality and budgetary restraint. Following this idea, governments in service economies have to choose two out of these three objectives, as all three of them cannot be reconciled.
For many Continental European countries with so-called “Bismarckian” welfare states such as France, Germany, Italy or Spain, the common wisdom is that employment has often been sacrificed to reduce inequality and – often unsuccessfully – contain taxation at the same time. Redistribution is funded through payroll contributions levied on wages rather than by general taxes, which tends to price out low-skilled workers. The amount of contributions employers have to pay even on low salaries can make them too expensive, and earnings-related benefits and minimum wages possibly prevent the entry of low-skilled workers. In Mediterranean countries like Spain, Italy, Greece or Portugal, the problem also often emphasised is the rigidity of labour laws which tend to protect the “insiders” – people who have entered the labour market in the period of growth in the 1960s to 1990s, making it harder for new entrants to get in. The result of this is that young people are much more affected by unemployment in spite of the fact that they are typically much more qualified than their parents. On top of this, poor childcare inherited from a strong *male breadwinner” bias combined with the loosening of family structures typically hampers female employment in Southern Europe: in 2012, only 54% of Spanish women and 50.5% of Italian women between 20 and 64 were in employment (64% and 71 for men respectively). The corresponding figure for Denmark was 72.2 (females) and 78.8 (males). Even considering lower employment rates in general, the gender gap in employment is typically greater in the South.
The first strategy governments can pursue to increase employment while keeping a lid on public expenditure is the Anglo-Saxon way, namely mass deregulation to price in workers again at the bottom of the labour market. It is also the one that is being pushed by European institutions, Germany and the current Spanish government. By cutting down payroll contributions and benefits, what is sought is the expansion of the labour market downwards, through low wage-jobs. It is understandable that Germany is pushing for this kind of solution because it is the strategy that it has pursued itself since the early 2000s, with the rise of mini-jobs, the Hartz reforms and a deliberate strategy of wage compression by German trade unions. The obvious direct consequences of this strategy are the higher income inequalities typical of Anglo-Saxon economies. Income inequalities in Germany also seem to have increased considerably in recent years in spite of the “jobs miracle”. It is unclear, however, whether deregulation is really able to increase employment across a wider set of countries. Moreover, the internal devaluation strategy pursued by Germany to boost exports and run a positive trade balance can only work if other countries run a trade deficit: we cannot all be Germans at the same time.
The second strategy is the Scandinavian way. It consists in the massive expansion of the public sector to provide a wide variety of social services funded by high levels of taxes. Countries like Denmark, Norway or Sweden tend to have higher employment levels at least in part because the state provides or subsidises a large variety of quality social services such as childcare, which not only employ a large workforce, but also tend to facilitate female employment. Affordable childcare allows both members of households to be employed, while its absence often forces a member of South European households – typically the woman – to choose to stay at home. Moreover, theses countries invest massively in active labour market policies. Obviously, the price to pay for this strategy is very high levels of taxation to fund the state, or alternatively, an increase in borrowing. In the context of fiscal austerity that pervades almost all European countries, this is politically very difficult, or even impossible. Countries like France, however, still have large programs of publicly subsidised employment for young people. In 2013, a quarter of jobs held by people below 25 were partly subsidised by the state.
If deregulation creates inequality and is not guaranteed to work, while public sector expansion is very expensive, what is left? In a forthcoming book chapter with Jelle Visser, we argue that there may be a third “liberal-corporatist” way based on the experience of countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, where employment participation is high, inequality is low to moderate, and the public sector is nowhere near the size of Scandinavian countries. This model relies on the widespread use of part-time employment and strong systems of occupational skills lifting wages in the bottom of the labour market. The Netherlands and Switzerland have the highest incidence of part-time employment in the OECD, and Switzerland has one of the lowest income inequality levels in the OECD in spite of the fact that it redistributes as little as the United States. In a context where public sector expansion and extensive subsidised childcare as found in Scandinavian countries are politically difficult to put in place, the increase of part-time employment has been a private response allowing women in particular to reconcile childcare with labour market participation. Interestingly, the places where the Dutch and Swiss social models perform particularly well are those in which Southern European countries are lacking, notably for female, elderly, and youth employment. The latter is largely due to strong systems of vocational training which ensure a better transition from school to work, so that the alternative is not only between dropping out of school with low skills or going to university, a system which also tends to foster income inequalities. In all these respects, they can represent a politically viable way to escape the trilemma outlined above at a lower cost in terms of public finances and inequality.
Of course, any supply-side reform agenda is constrained by the availability of demand, which is a massive problem in Southern Europe. Governments are cutting spending at a time when households are reducing their consumption. Supply-side reforms are of little incidence if nobody at home or abroad is buying anything. In Switzerland and the Netherlands as well, high employment has been underpinned by some form of demand-stimulating factor whose sustainability is uncertain. In the Netherlands, tax exemptions on mortgages have encouraged ever-inflating house prices and the highest levels of mortgage debt in Europe. At the moment, the country has fallen in recession, and the government has cut spending at a time when households are seeking to reduce their debt level. In short, while the Dutch government was a harsh advocate of austerity in Southern Europe, it finds itself entrapped in the same kind of “balance-sheet recession” that Spain is facing. In Switzerland, domestic demand has been maintained by very high levels of immigration since the mid-2000s, compensating for declining exports due to the appreciation of the Swiss franc (as a consequence of the depreciation of the euro), and anaemic demand in the Eurozone. The sustainability of this strategy can be questioned as well, as population growth cannot be pursued indefinitely.
So I have written a blog post (both in Spanish on El Diario’s Agenda Publica and in English on the LSE’s Europp blog) that seeks to explain why the Portuguese party system has stayed relatively stable in the face of austerity policies while the Greek party system has exploded. The main arguments were
1) that the more extensive nature of party patronage in Greece has made mainstream parties more vulnerable to austerity policies . Since they relied quite heavily on the distribution of rents (public sector jobs, pensions and social benefits targeted at specific groups) as a way to reward voters, they collapsed when these tools were ruled out by Troika-imposed austerity. Portuguese parties, by contrast, could not really rely on these strategies in the run-up to the crisis because of low growth and deteriorating public finances. No growth, no leeway to distribute rents, better resilience.
2) that responsibility was easier to attribute in the Greek case, where PASOK ruled alone in the run-up and in the direct aftermath of the bailout, whereas the Portuguese PS and PSD formed an informal coalition which diluted responsibility. I wrote that in the political context of Southern Europe, where everything you do is bound to be unpopular, the only solution left for parties if they want to survive may be to form a political cartel to defuse blame.
A few points of background: I came up with the first part of the argument while working on a paper with two Greek colleagues. Obviously, it is quite difficult to test empirically but I thought it would be worth throwing it out there. The second was inspired by existing arguments about the politics of blame avoidance in welfare state reform (for instance here). Since, I only wrote about two countries, it is obviously difficult to say which mechanism is the most important. Moreover, one can think of a number of other reasons that can explain variations in outcomes, such as historical traditions, different cultures of protest, etc. I am personally skeptical towards cultural explanations because anything can be explained by culture, but it’s probably a matter of taste. As a political economist, I tend to favour explanations that involve some form of material/economic interest.
The post has generated a number of reactions. Some said it was just utter nonsense and that I didn’t know what I was talking about. I suspect that the argument may have come across as saying that democratic politics is alive and well in Portugal as compared to Greece where democracy is on the brink of collapse. This is really not what I meant. Recent polls indicate that 88% of Portuguese citizens do not trust the government (see this as well, which points to similar developments elsewhere in Southern Europe). The question is to know when this distrust and anger translates into the collapse of existing parties (as in Greece or Italy) and when it translates into abstention and apathy (as in Portugal and perhaps Spain). This latter occurrence is of course damageable for democracy, but as far as party competition is concerned, it does not change much.
Pedro Magalhães from the Insitute of Social Sciences in Lisbon has posted a well-thought reply that takes a critical take on some of the arguments. I am sincerely honoured that somebody took the time to take on these ideas. The points raised by Magalhães have to do with the generalizability of the argument, and the idea of the political cartel as the only viable option for parties to survive. These are very valid points and I thought I’d say a few things about them.
Magalhães rightly points that the two countries where the party system seems to have been substantially transformed are precisely those where technocratic governments were formed, namely Italy and Greece. In these countries, technocratic governments or grand coalitions have generated a backlash, with the electoral surge of Beppe Grillo’s Movimento Cinque Stelle in Italy and Syriza or Golden Dawn in Greece. I think that this evolution has a lot in common with the rise of the populist radical right in so-called “consensus” democracies such as Austria, Switzerland, Denmark or the Netherlands. In these countries, coalition governments have de facto constituted a political cartel that isolated policymaking from electoral pressure for years. Writing about Switzerland and Austria in 2000, Richard Rose wrote that “a grand coalition is vulnerable to becoming a monopoly unresponsive to new issues. Sooner or later, some citizens will abandon established loyalties and vote for the rascal they do not know in preference to those that they know too well”. In many ways, this could apply very well to what has happened in Greece and Italy, and goes along Magalhães’s argument. When you seek to insulate policymaking from electoral politics, you are bound to face severe anti-system protest and electoral setbacks.
Now, when I wrote that forming a political cartel was probably the only viable option for parties to survive, I was probably wrong. In fact, after giving it some thought, I think that there are two strategies mainstream parties (those with an aspiration to govern) can pursue in the context of the crisis, and each of them has severe electoral drawbacks. Basically, there is the “plague” option and the “cholera” option.
They can collude and form a cartel to implement austerity and commit not to blame each other (Kent weaver calls it « circling the wagons »), which sooner or later may cause an electoral backlash and the strengthening of anti-system parties as discussed above. This is the Greek and Italian case.
Opposition parties can oppose austerity and blame the government for licking the boots of the Troika (“jump on the bandwagon”). The problem of this strategy is that agenda control in Southern Europe is extremely reduced in the current set of supranational/economic constraints. If you blame the government for austerity but want to stay in the eurozone, you will probably have to carry out the very same type of policies that you oppose when you come back to office. One way or another, you will have to betray your voters and face the electoral consequences. You can make voters believe that normal political competition can take place and that alternative agendas exist, but there is in fact only one policy option and it is largely dictated from outside.
There are still a number of questions that I still can’t figure out. For instance, why has Syriza become the first party on the left in Greece, while the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda or the Communist party do not seem to have benefitted from the crisis? As I said elsewhere, I suspect that there is a pervasive tendency of Portuguese citizens to choose exit rather than voice, notably through emigration and/or abstention, while this tendency is not present in Greece. I would be quite curious to discover ways to investigate this link empirically.
I don’t have the answer. I have just been playing with Barro and Lee’s dataset on education attainment. As the name indicates, it covers education attainment in 146 countries between 1950 and 2010 for different age groups. The two charts above show the average years of schooling of the population 25 and over since 1950 in 27 countries. I know that the first graph is difficult to read, but the point is to show Portugal’s outlier status in comparison with all other European countries. With 7.73 years of schooling on average, the Portuguese workforce was the least qualified in the EU in 2010; the average for the countries showed in the graph is 10.62. Portugal started below everybody else in 1950 (compulsory schooling under Salazar was 4 years, and many were simply not enrolled) but I cannot really understand why it is still lagging behind Spain, which started from a similar position, namely a long fascist dictatorship keen on maintaining a docile and uneducated populace.
The three graphs below show the population (25 and over) between 1950 and 2010 in Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (as a point of comparison for “advanced” countries) by highest degree attained (but not necessarily completed). Even if a higher proportion of the Spanish population had no schooling at all in 1950, this share has been reduced dramatically while it has remained at high levels in Portugal. According to the data, 11.5% of the Portuguese population had no schooling at all in 2010, and 46% had gone through primary schooling only. The corresponding numbers are 1.6 and 25% in Spain, and 1.6 and 11% in Sweden. This happens in spite of the fact that Portugal has a fairly low student-teacher ratio and has invested massively in education over the past few decades. However, as the number of PhDs has exploded, the problem of low skills at the bottom is still huge. As we know, low productivity is a big problem in Southern Europe, and this is probably strongly related to low education levels. Cuts in spending certainly won’t help to solve this problem.
This shows the electoral score of the two mainstream parties in Greece and Portugal in 2009 (before the outbreak of the crisis) and in 2011 (in Portugal) and 2012 (in Greece), after the outbreak of the crisis. For Greece, this shows the results of the May elections; new elections were held in June as no governmnet could be formed. What is striking is how mainstream Portuguese parties have been resilient compared to Greek parties, and especially PASOK, which completely collapsed. The cumulative vote share of the PS and the PSD remained stable, while it lost 42% in Greece. As we know, support for fringe parties has soared in Greece (Syriza, Golden Dawn) while radical left parties in Portugal (Bloco de Esquerda and the Communist Party) have remained at astonishingly low levels.
I see two explanations for this. First, as I argued here, Portuguese citizens seem to prefer “exit” (abstention, emigration) over “voice”. Second, the base of support for Greek parties drew heavily on a spoils system (public sector jobs, pensions, cartelistic rights) and they didn’t differ much ideologically. By reducing public spending and removing these cartelistic rights, austerity directly undermines their base of support. Since PASOK and ND could no longer offer rents to voters because the money was gone, voters abandoned them. In Portugal, austerity had started before the crisis, as the 2000s were a lost decade in terms of growth (no real estate bubble). Hence, parties could not rely on the kind of spoils system that PASOK and ND drew on. There is some data on party patronage that shows these differences.
The data come from Andrew Watt’s and Sotiria Theodoropoulou’s ETUI report, (p. 14) based on a survey of country experts. Some data, from Italy and Spain most notably, are missing. This is partly based on 2011 estimates, and as we know forecasts have been all but reliable. There is more data on this on the Washington Post’s wonkblog and the Guardian writes this about the UK.
What the Guardian doesn’t explain is whether the coalition wants to “shrink the state” through (1) net cuts in spending or (2) by keeping its progression lower than economic growth. From the data it seems that it’s been (1) until now and it should be (2) from now on. Of course, (2) depends on the return of growth, but since it’s still waiting for the confidence fairy, we may be stuck with (1).
On Monday, the Portuguese Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar resigned. Gaspar was the main architect of Portugal’s austerity drive since its bailout two years ago. His political charisma was akin to a flat bike tyre, but he was considered a major guarantee of credibility for the Troika and Portugal’s creditors. Apparently, he had already asked to resign last year after the constitutional court invalidated a number of the austerity measures contained in his budget for 2013. However, his resignation was then denied by the Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho.
Yesterday, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and leader of the minority coalition partner CDS-PP, Paulo Portas also asked to resign to protest against the nomination of Gaspar’s replacement, Maria Luis Albuquerque. Earlier this year, he had already expressed his disagreement with some of the austerity measures carried out by his own government, notably an increase in the taxation of pensions. This would badly hurt his traditional electorate of pensioners, but he acquiesced because it was a condition imposed by the Troika. Since he is the leader of the minority coalition partner, it would have been difficult to imagine his party staying in the coalition, and early elections were probably the most likely outcome. However, once again, Pedro Passos Coelho refused Portas’s resignation, saying it was premature. Passos Coelho said he wouldn’t resign either despite the unpopularity of his government. We don’t really know what’s going to happen now. Passos Coelho said he would talk to the CDS-PP to maintain a majority, but all its ministers seem to have their resignation letter ready. Nobody knows what’s happening next, but Portuguese bond yields have soared, making another bailout quite likely.
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from this.
Second, this shows the dilemma of small parties like the CDS-PP when they coalesce with conservative parties that implement austerity. Even if there is no real populist radical right party (PRRPs) in Portugal, the electorate of the CDS-PP is pretty similar to that of PRRPs elsewhere in Europe: pensioners, farmers and other groups that often depend on government transfers. These parties have electorates that are attached to the welfare state, but they can only coalesce with right-wing parties that are likely to retrench it. As a consequence, they take the blame for policies that they don’t really want in the first place. Something very similar happened with the Austrian FPÖ when they were in a coalition with the conservative ÖVP between 1999 and 2006. They supported a number of retrenchment policies which hurt their own electorate, and the party collapsed in 2002, giving birth to a splinter group, the BZÖ. More recently, in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’s PVV agreed to support the first (minority) right-wing cabinet of Mark Rutte (VVD) without formally taking part in government. The government engaged in harsh austerity measures in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and Wilders eventually withdrew his support because of disagreements about the size of austerity measures, notably about pensions, causing the cabinet to fall. In the following elections, the PVV lost a third of its votes. Similarly, even if their electorate is different, the electoral prospects of the Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom look fairly grim after they had to betray a number of their electoral promises, notably not to raise tuition fees. For these parties, it seems really difficult to hold office and keep voters at the same time.
Nuno Severiano Teixeira and António Costa Pinto (eds) (2012) The Europeanization of Portuguese Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. 278pp, £38.00, ISBN 978 0 88033 946 9. Buy it here
This book analyses the Europeanisation of democracy in Portugal between the Carnation Revolution in 1974 until about 2010. Portugal has recently come to the forefront of debates on European integration because it has been one of the countries most severely hit by the Eurozone crisis. By contrast to Greece, it has been presented as a rather “good pupil” in the implementation of austerity measures imposed by international financial institutions. However, the academic literature on this country and its relationship to European integration has been rather scarce, and this book is therefore a welcome contribution to a better understanding of the role of European integration in Southern Europe.
The book contains nine chapters dealing with the interaction between European integration and democratisation, the attitudes of political elites towards the EU, the Europeanisation of executive power, of the Parliament, of courts, of interest groups, and of public opinion. The general picture which emerges throughout the chapters is that of a mutually reinforcing dynamic between democratisation and European integration. After the fall of the dictatorship, European integration was seen as the means to definitively part ways with the authoritarian past, stabilise the parliamentary system after the years of turmoil that followed the revolution, and modernise an economy whose structures had been shaped by a huge colonial empire. As a whole, democracy and European integration appear as “brothers in arms”, as emphasised in Vink’s closing chapter.
Many of the contributions provide valuable insights into the workings of the Portuguese political system. However, the book generally gives a fairly dated impression in the light of recent events linked to the crisis, like a book on the GDR that would have been printed in the summer of 1989. Even if the publishing cycle may certainly be responsible for this, there are very few explanatory elements throughout the chapters that could help explain current events, set aside the introduction by Nuno Severiano Teixeira highlighting the decade of divergence that preceded the crisis, or Pedro Magalhães’s chapter showing the decline in popular support for European integration. In many ways, it seems that the strong enthusiasm for European integration emphasised in the book has concealed deeper politico-economic logics that are only superficially tackled. As the harsh austerity measures recently implemented by the Portuguese government have been essentially justified by the fact that “there is no choice” in the face of EU commitments, the relationship between European integration and democracy in this country now seems much less positive.
Même s’il a été l’un des pays les plus touchés par la crise de la zone euro, le Portugal n’a pas fait beaucoup de vagues malgré une situation économique catastrophique. Au contraire, le gouvernement de Pedro Passos Coelho arrivé au pouvoir en 2011 a été un bon élève de la Troika, et a diligemment mis en œuvre les mesures d’austérité que celle-ci a imposées malgré les conséquences dramatiques sur la consommation. Malgré un taux de chômage à 18% (42% chez les jeunes), le troisième plus élevé de l’UE, et un PIB qui a décru à son niveau de 2001, le pays n’a pas subi l’effondrement des partis traditionnels et l’émergence de l’extrême droite comme en Grèce, ni l’instabilité politique que l’on a pu voir en Italie. Comparées aux scènes de guerre diffusées depuis Athènes, les manifestations anti-austérité qui ont eu lieu a Lisbonne ont semblé bien paisibles. Cette apparente résignation peut s’expliquer en partie par l’importance du canal traditionnel de résolution des tensions sociales : l’émigration.
Contrairement à la Grèce, à l’Espagne ou à l’Irlande, le Portugal n’a pas connu de bulle immobilière depuis son entrée dans l’euro. Alors que ces pays ont connu une période faste soutenue par des taux d’intérêt bas alignés sur l’Allemagne, le Portugal, comme l’Italie, a traversé une décennie perdue marqué par la stagnation économique, la détérioration des finances publiques et l’endettement privé. Avec l’euro a un niveau surévalué, ses exportations ont perdu en compétitivité et sa balance commerciale s’est déséquilibrée, surtout face aux nouveaux pays de l’UE à la main d’œuvre moins chère et souvent mieux qualifiée. Dans ce contexte, l’austérité a commencé bien avant la crise de l’euro. Le gouvernement socialiste de José Socrates arrivé au pouvoir en 2005 avait déjà entamé un bon nombre de réformes impopulaires pour réduire les déficits publics. Après 2009, les taux d’intérêts sur la dette ont pris l’ascenseur, et les socialistes, cette fois à la tête d’un gouvernement de minorité, ont négocié une série de paquets d’économies avec l’opposition de droite. Ces mesures incluaient un gel des salaires de la fonction publique et des prestations sociales, combinées avec des hausse d’impôts considérables.
En avril 2011, après que l’opposition a refusé de soutenir le quatrième paquet d’économie, Socrates a démissionné et demandé en catastrophe l’assistance financière de la BCE, de l’UE et du FMI, devenant ainsi le troisième pays a être secouru par la Troika. Durant la campagne électorale qui a suivi, le chef de l’opposition Pedro Passos Coelho avait promise d’aller « plus loin que la Troika » dans la réduction des déficits publics. Après son élection, la droite a en effet poursuivi et poussé encore plus loin la politique d’austérité des socialistes sous les auspices de la Troika. Les 13e et 14e salaires de la fonction publique ont été suspendus, et le budget 2013 prévoyait les augmentations d’impôt les plus importantes depuis la fin de la dictature. La plupart des entreprises publiques ont été ou sont sur le point d’être vendues : la compagnie d’électricité EDP a passé sous contrôle chinois, la compagnie aérienne TAP est à la recherche d’un repreneur, et le gouvernement souhaite également privatiser la télévision publique RTP. Ces réformes, destinées avant tout à impressionner la Troika, ont été un échec quant à la réduction de la dette et au retour de la croissance. Les prévisions ont été maintes fois revues à la baisse en raison des effets multiplicateurs des coupes budgétaires. Même si l’opposition socialiste a récemment adopté une posture plus combative, elle est consciente qu’elle même a adopté les mêmes politiques auparavant, et n’a pas de menace crédible sur sa gauche. Le vieux Parti Communiste et le Bloc de Gauche ont été incapables de tirer profit de la crise. Contrairement à la Grèce et à l’Italie, les Portugais semblent préférer voter avec leurs pieds plutôt que dans les urnes. Depuis 1998, 1 million de personnes sont parties pour fuir la stagnation économique, notamment vers la Suisse, et cette tendance s’est fortement accélérée au cours des trois dernières années. En 2011, plus de 100’000 portugais ont émigré, un niveau similaire aux grandes vagues des années 1960, lorsque la dictature de Salazar tolérait l’émigration pour réduire les tensions sociales. Entre Salazar et la Troika, beaucoup de Portugais qui ont manifesté récemment en brandissant les symboles de la révolution des œillets pensent que peu a changé.