Which leagues are the main suppliers of players at the World Cup?

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The graph above represents a network of countries qualified for the World Cup 2018 and football leagues where players play. To draw it, I have used the official list of the 738 players qualified, and used it to draw a two-mode network where the countries they play for are the source, and the leagues where they play are the targets. Nodes are sized by the total number of players playing in each league, and each arrow indicates the number of players from each country playing in each league (you can click to get a bigger version). Not that many surprises here: The English premier League is the largest supplier with 124 players (almost 17 percent of all players!), followed by the Spanish Liga (81), the Bundesliga (67) and the Serie A (58, in spite of the fact that Italy is not qualified).

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The party systems of 12 European countries in 2018, in one chart.

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Data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2018 has just been released. I have made the graph above using the data and using the usual two axes: left-right on the economy, and liberal/authoritarian.

Welfare States and the Birth of Immigration Control

How has the emergence and transformation of welfare states influenced immigration policies? Assuming that there is a trade-off between social rights and openness, has the expansion of welfare states over time led to a greater need for governments to control access via immigration control or restrictions on migrant rights? The transition from minimal state and open borders in the period 1870-1914 to the take-off in social spending and restrictive immigration policy in the period that followed points in this direction. However, can the causal link between these two policy domains be proven empirically? In this talk given at the LIMS seminar at Leiden University on March 14, 2018, I present some data and hypotheses on this connection.

Flipping the Classroom in Political Science Research Methods

Today we have the first post in a series on building a flipped course by Natascha van der Zwan and Alexandre Afonso. Both are assistant professors at the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University, the Netherlands. 709 more words

via Flipping the Research Methods Classroom, Part 1 — Active Learning in Political Science ©

Share of people who think that jobs should be reserved for men when jobs are scarce.

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From the European Social Survey 2010. Hungary, the only country where a majority of people think that jobs should be reserved for men.

Est-ce que la radiotélé publique survivrait à NoBillag?

Les défenseurs de l’initiative No billag ne veulent plus admettre qu’ils souhaitent supprimer la radio et télévision publiques en Suisse. Le problème, c’est que les programmes de la RTS sont populaires, contrairement à l’organisme qui collecte les fonds pour les financer. Le sondage Iakom montre que les programmes publics en Suisse sont systématiquement mieux notés que les offres privées pour ce qui concerne la professionnalité, le contenu de l’information ou la neutralité des programmes (Figure ci-dessous). En 2011, un sondage montrait également que 64% des sondés étaient satisfaits des programmes de la télévision publique, et 74% de la radio. Le pourcentage de satisfaction des médias privés était bien plus bas.

Capture d_écran 2018-02-09 à 16.37.11

Niveau de satisfaction avec les programmes publics et privés (1=très mauvais; 5= excellent). En Bleu= Suisse Romande.

Face à ce constat, les initiants affirment maintenant que les personnes qui veulent les programmes de la RTS pourraient les financer sur une base volontaire, sans la contrainte de la redevance obligatoire. Il faut noter qu’il ne pourrait pas y avoir d’autre financement public fédéral de quelque sorte: le texte de l’initiative l’interdit expressément.

La question est de savoir si ce système purement volontaire fonctionnerait. En théorie, tout le monde payerait pour ce qu’il consomme. Puisque les suisses sont satisfaits des programmes de la RTS, pourquoi ne payeraient-ils pas d’eux-mêmes? En pratique, c’est très peu vraisemblable. C’est un phénomène que l’on connaît bien en économie: tout le monde veut toujours jouir de services sans en avoir à en payer le prix. On appelle ça le “dilemme de l’action collective”.

Ainsi, tout le monde veut de l’énergie électrique pas chère, mais personne ne veut habiter près d’une centrale nucléaire ou d’un dépôt de déchets radioactifs. Tout le monde veut pouvoir bénéficier d’une transplantation en cas d’accident mais nous avons un déficit chronique de donneurs d’organes. Il y a une myriade d’exemples qui prouvent que même si une majorité d’individus désirent un service ou un bien public, chacun va essayer de minimiser sa propre contribution, soit par choix délibéré, soit pas inertie, paresse ou manque de temps. C’est précisément pour cela que l’on a un système d’assurance maladie obligatoire. Aux Etats-Unis, où le système n’était pas obligatoire jusqu’à Obamacare, on a une masse très important de personnes non assurées mais qui utilisent tout de même les services de santé en situation d’urgence. Le résultat: le système Américain sans obligation est le plus cher des pays avancés. Ainsi, ce n’est pas parce qu’une masse d’individus bénéficieraient collectivement de quelque chose qu’il vont contribuer à le produire. C’est triste, mais c’est extrêmement normal.

Si la redevance TV devenait volontaire, il est très peu vraisemblable que la RSR puisse générer le même niveau de revenu et assurer les mêmes prestations, parce que des programmes d’information nationale et locale en 4 langues sont très chers à produire. Puisque la base de contributeurs diminuerait presque certainement, la redevance devrait augmenter sur une base plus petite de contribuables, rendant le système insoutenable. Alternativement, il devrait y avoir une augmentation considérable de la publicité. Contrairement à un système de souscription comme Netflix, qui peut vendre ses programmes dans des centaines de pays, des programmes comme Infrarouge ou Arena, ou les infos locales jurassiennes, ont une base de marché très petite. L’offre telle que nous la connaissons serait drastiquement réduite, et la satisfaction des téléspectateurs diminuerait certainement également. A ma connaissance, il n’y a aucun système de télévision publique qui est financé selon ce modèle.

La disparition ou la réduction massive de la SSR pourrait-elle être compensée par une offre privée? Pour savoir à quoi un système médiatique audiovisuel complètement privé ressemblerait, on peut penser à deux exemple: presse écrite suisse et la télévision américaine.

On sait bien ce qui s’est passé au cours des quinze dernière années dans la presse romande, où il n’y a pas d’acteur public: dans un marché petit marqué par le déclin des revenus publicitaires, la plupart des éditeurs romands ont été avalés par des mammouths alémaniques (Tamedia). Le feu Matin Bleu a été mangé par 20 Minutes qui recycle ses articles en allemand, le reste étant rédigé par des stagiaires. L’Hebdo a fermé ses portes, et le Matin, jadis le premier quotidien romand, va certainement enterrer son édition papier. Sur la ligne de touche, Christoph Blocher a racheté un bon nombre de journaux alémaniques avec une stratégie politique peu voilée.

Le deuxième exemple est la télévision américaine, où les grands réseaux privés (Fox, CNN, NBC) dominent les audiences sans interférence publique. Le résultat, ce sont des chaines hyper-politisées qui fonctionnent essentiellement en vase clos avec des profils idéologiques extrêmement marqués. Certains mettent en avant le role de la télévision dans le processus de polarisation qui a rendu la politique américaine si toxique au cours des dernières années. On ne saurait imaginer ce que ce genre de système dans un pays divers comme la Suisse pourrait créer.

Les arguments libertariens des pro-No Billag évoquent la liberté de choix comme argument, mais le monde dans lequel leurs utopies fonctionnerait n’existe malheureusement pas.

 

 

To be less dependent on immigration, Britain must change its model of capitalism

The British economy is structurally dependent on migrant workers because it is lightly regulated and depends heavily on domestic demand, write Alexandre Afonso and Camilla Devitt. They explain why less immigration will require a greater role for the state.

The desire to lower immigration has been one of the main drivers behind the Brexit vote. Now, Theresa May’s cabinet has signaled its resolve to cut down numbers significantly, a longstanding pledge that the Conservatives had failed to make good on up to recently. With Brexit becoming a reality, however, the UK can expect lower inward migration, and numbers have been falling already.

Reduced immigration will be due to the restrictions on free movement the government will put in place and weaker economic growth (Britain has grown at a much slower rate than any other major economy in 2017). A number of EU citizens faced with uncertainties about their status will also probably leave. For the British economy, less immigration will be problematic because it has come to structurally depend on it at both ends of its labor market, mostly due to its liberal and demand-driven economic model.

In a recent article in the Socio-Economic Review, we argue that different varieties of capitalism – how the economy is organised across countries – generate different levels of demand for migrant workers. In this perspective, the UK displays features that make it especially dependent on migrant labour. The UK combines the features of a so-called Liberal Market Economy (with low employment protection, a lightly regulated labour market, and a large low-wage sector) and a consumption-led growth model (which depends heavily on domestic household consumption and population growth rather than exports). These institutional features have strengthened demand for migrant workers to compensate for mismatches and imbalances in the socio-economic regime.

First, the British economy is a demand-led economy which relies to a greater extent on domestic consumption than export-led economies such as Germany. The UK draws to a greater extent on population growth and increasing house prices. Unlike Germany, where exports of goods and services represented 46% of GDP in 2016, this share was only 28% in the UK. Another major difference is population growth: between 2006 and 2016, the British population has grown at a much higher rate than the EU average: 0.75% per year against 0.3% (0.3% for Germany). Immigration accounts for more than half of this growth, and reducing the number of people coming into the country (and consuming goods and services) will inevitably weaken what had become an important driver of growth.

This is important because apart from financial services, Britain’s export performance appears to be too weak to compensate for a smaller domestic demand. While Germany still has a strong export-oriented manufacturing base, the United Kingdom relies more heavily on services, not only high-skilled (e.g finance) but also low-skilled sectors (retail, cafés, restaurants, personal and social services) and the construction sector. These sectors depend to a larger extent on migrant workers, especially in low-paid employment. For instance, 41% of packers, bottlers, canners, and fillers in the UK are EU nationals, and so are 26% of cleaners and housekeepers.

Second, because of the liberal nature of the labour market, there is a comparatively high number of low-paying jobs that natives are reluctant to take up. About 20% of jobs in Britain are low-paid (that is, they are paid less than two-thirds of gross median earnings) while this percentage is only about 10% in France and 8% in Denmark. The turn to austerity pursued by the Conservative government may have paradoxically increased this demand for low-wage migrant workers. In social care, for example, pressure for cost containment due to austerity has led to a deterioration of working conditions, and migrant workers are often the only ones who accept the low wages and asocial working hours that these jobs entail.

In sum, the British economy offers many low-paying jobs that natives, due to higher expectations, are reluctant to accept. This mismatch is filled by migrant workers. Catering, construction and care – all domestic services sectors which had come to depend heavily on EU workers – have now all reported difficulties in finding labour in the aftermath of Brexit.

Third, the dependence on EU migration has also been accentuated by decades of deregulation which have lowered incentives for firms to produce skills domestically. This is a classic collective action problem: in order to have an adequate supply of skills, firms need to cooperate and pool resources to train new workers. However, it may be selfishly more expedient to let other firms train workers and then “poach” them without paying for training. If everybody is rational, no workers are trained.

A case in point is the construction sector, which has come to rely heavily on EU workers to compensate for the lack of domestic skills. Faced with fierce competition on costs, large-scale subcontracting and the widespread use of “bogus” self-employment, companies have been reluctant to invest in training workers, and the workforce is less skilled than its equivalents in other European countries. Naturally, it has been easier for firms to draw on the skills of workers trained abroad, especially from Poland or other Eastern European countries.

Once again, EU workers have been used to plug the mismatch between the demand and supply of skills in the British labour market, and many British firms have been free-riding on skills produced abroad. This situation is not new. The NHS is a case in point: in 1971 already, 31% of all doctors working in the NHS in England were born and qualified overseas.

There has been a fundamental contradiction in the combination of economic liberalism and hostility to immigration that has characterised Conservative policies in recent years, because austerity and free market economics tend to bolster demand for immigrants. In fact, countries which experience lower levels of immigration (e.g France) are also much more interventionist in economic policies, have larger public sectors, and higher taxes. Coping with lower immigration will most probably require a greater role for the state in training and regulation to solve the labour mismatches that immigration was solving up to now. The more interventionist tone of the last Tory manifesto may be a sign of this reorientation.

Originally posted on the LSE’s British Politics and Policy Blog.

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